A Dream of Peace.

BY ERNEST NEAL LYON.

Our planet swings from darkling space
To crystal day, —
Productive of a taller race
Than brutish clay,
When Reason rules within the place
Of rifle-play.

With kindling vision Nations then
Will drop the sword,
In common parliament shall men
Find swift accord,
And thought be regnant, by the pen,
Or glowing word!

"To men goodwill!" the prophecy,
Awaited long,
May then reveal its mystery, —
While, sweetly strong,
In Brotherhood's antiphony
Ascends the song!

Yet, while we pray, — red, angry Mars,
With baleful gleam,
Obscures anew the Bethlehem star's
Benignant beam, —
While breaks the clash of battle-cars
Upon our dream!

The spirit conquers! And once more
Souls seek release.
The tumult passes! As before,
The war-songs cease.
And angel-voices, loved of yore,
Now carol peace!

— *The Independent.*

The Interparliamentary Union and the Cause of International Arbitration.

Speech of Hon. Richard Bartholdt of Missouri in the House of Representatives, January 19.

Mr. Chairman: In the early days of April of last year the Congress passed a joint resolution extending an invitation to the members of what is now known the world over as the "Interparliamentary Union" to visit the United States and hold their annual conference on American soil, and providing at the same time for an appropriation of fifty thousand dollars for their entertainment. In effect, the passage of that resolution meant the fulfillment of a promise I had made as the only American delegate attending the conference of that organization held the year before at Vienna, to the effect that if the members would only decide to come to our country an official invitation by Congress and our government would surely be forthcoming, and American hospitality, proverbial the world over, would not be lacking in the matter of their entertainment.

In pursuance of that resolution the twelfth conference of that international organization of lawmakers was held in the city of St. Louis, in connection with the great World's Fair, during the three days of September 12, 13 and 14 of last year. The delegates from abroad who attended the conference were, in accordance with the instructions of Congress, treated as the guests of the nation from the day of their arrival to practically the time of their departure, and now that they have come and gone I feel it incumbent upon me, as chairman of the reception committee and president of the Interparliamentary Union, as well as of its American branch, to make a report to this House on not only the character of that organization and its deliberations at St. Louis, but also on the far-reaching diplomatic results of that great international conference. I feel, and most of you will probably agree with me, that since Congress made this event possible its history should find a place somewhere in the *Congressional Record*, the more so because the time of that conference marks, and will by future historians be regarded as a new epoch in the diplomatic history of our country. While the advocacy of international arbitration is an American tradition, yet the year 1904 will be memorable for all time to come because the United States Government then appeared in the arena of the world's politics as a leader in the great movement for its general adoption by the civilized nations of the earth.

What is the Interparliamentary Union, who are its members, and what are its aims and objects? An answer to these questions is necessary for the better understanding of what has recently occurred and of what has been accomplished. The organization may be best described as the nearest realization at the present time of what the poet has beautifully called the "Parliament of Man." It is a parliament of parliaments, a union composed of lawmakers of the different countries, and which every member of every legislative body of the world has a right to join. It had a small beginning. On October 31, 1888, thirty members of the French Chamber of Deputies and ten members of the English Parliament met at a plain hotel in Paris to discuss the project of an arbitration treaty between France, England, and the United States. This was the birth of the child, and William Randal Cremer, an English deputy, and Frederic Passy of the French Chamber were its godfathers. To these two men really belong the credit for having originated the idea that members of all the parliaments of the world should meet occasionally for the purpose of discussing questions which may be of common interest to all civilized nations alike. The idea inspired immediate action. Invitations were at once issued to all the other parliaments, and in 1889, during the Paris Exposition, the first so-called "interparliamentary conference" was held at the French capital. Though the attendance was small, and though the first declarations in favor of international peace were met with derision and satire by part of the press, the movement grew, and the second conference in London, in 1890, was attended by a much larger number of deputies from an increased number of countries.

When, in 1891, the third conference convened in Rome, the delegates met at the capitol building, and were welcomed, on behalf of the government, by the prime minister of the Kingdom. At this conference Germany and Austria-Hungary were represented for the first time, and from it resulted the establishment of a central bureau at Berne, Switzerland. Since then the union has continued its labors and sessions with ever-increasing attendance and ever-growing influence upon the international relations

and the development of international law. Berne, Brussels, The Hague, Budapest, Christiania, Paris and Vienna in succession welcomed the members within their hospitable walls, so that last year's conference was the twelfth in the history of the union and the first ever held on American soil. Since the initial meeting at Paris it also was the first not held in the capitol building of the nation whose hospitality the delegates enjoyed.

At present there exist branches or groups of the Interparliamentary Union in all countries of Europe, except in Russia, Turkey and Spain. The reason why the two first-named countries are not represented in the union is obvious. They have no parliaments. I am proud to say, Mr. Chairman, that since the 13th day of January, 1904, the United States Congress, too, has an arbitration group, forty-three members having responded to the invitation to attend the initial meeting on that day. Since that time many more members have signified their intention of joining the organization. Indeed, there is no reason why every Senator and every member of this House should not join it, and thus make his influence felt in the councils of the civilized nations. Whether Republicans or Democrats, surely we all believe in the religion of humanity.

But let me explain more fully the aims and objects of the organization. As its name indicates, only members of national legislative bodies are eligible to membership, and they can maintain their connection with the union, in case of failure of reëlection, only for a certain number of years. Hence the body is made up, not of dreamers, theorists, and cranks, but of practical men of affairs who, instead of chasing rainbows, strive only for possible and practical reforms such as may be brought about by reasonable changes of existing conditions. Each member of the organization being elected by the people is responsible to the people, and this element of responsibility is possibly its strongest safeguard against the schemes and dreams of visionaries. The whole platform of the union is contained in the first section of its constitution, which reads as follows:

"The Interparliamentary Union consists of members of all parliaments who have organized groups in their respective countries or will organize them for the purpose of carrying out, either by legislation or international agreement, the principle that differences between the various nations shall be settled by arbitration."

And this brings me to the most successful meeting ever held in the annals of the union, the one held in the United States in September last. I say most successful because its result was the making of actual history. The real friends of arbitration in Europe have watched the wonderful growth and development of our country with ungrudging admiration. They are our friends, not our enviers. They know that we will not abuse our great power for conquest or war, and are satisfied that the mission of this great nation is one of peace and goodwill to all men. From what I know of them I am sure that if ever this traditional American policy were reversed, if ever we should undertake to rival the Old World in military armament, it would forever put out the light of hope in the hearts of the best and noblest everywhere. For years their eyes were turned longingly to the United States in the expectation that salvation and relief from well-nigh unbearable military burdens must some day come from this side of the Atlantic, and this hope had become the more desperate the more they realized that, in view of the jealousies and rivalries of the old monarchies, the land of the Star-Spangled Banner was really their last resort. To-day, I am happy to say, and we all have reason to felicitate ourselves upon the fact, that the distinguished foreigners who came as our guests to attend a peace conference upon American soil were not only not disappointed, but that the success of their mission surpassed their most sanguine expectations. They passed a resolution requesting the President of the United States to convene a second conference of nations at The Hague, in order that the work of the first may be perfected and completed, and President Roosevelt promptly responded, when they informed him of their desires, that he would accede to the request without delay. And when they respectfully submitted, further, that they had adopted resolutions in favor of the negotiation of arbitration treaties between the different countries, he surprised them with the statement that these treaties had already been drafted and were ready for the signatures of the different governments and for submission to the Senate of the United States. Do you wonder, gentlemen, that the White House rang with cheers and applause such as had never been heard on a like solemn occasion? There were present the representatives of fifteen different nations, so it was practically the civilized world that was applauding. It was as if I could see behind the two hundred and more distinguished statesmen who were clapping their hands the millions of pale-faced men, women, and children of the Old World whose very life-blood is systematically sucked out by the vampire of militarism, and whose plaudits and blessings were here being demonstratively expressed to an American president. If I was prouder of my American citizenship at any one time than another, it was on this memorable occasion. [Applause.]

What does it mean, Mr. Chairman? Does it mean war has now become an obsolete issue? No; the friends of arbitration are not so sanguine as that. They know that war cannot be abolished with a stroke of the pen, the same as murder cannot be abolished by law. But they ask — and it seems to me with good logic — if murder will continue to be committed, is this a reason why there should not be a law against it? Granted that wars could not be stopped, is this a reason why there should not be international agreements and international laws to make appeals to the sword less frequent and probable?

When a citizen has a controversy with his neighbor they are not allowed to take the law in their own hands, but civilized society and the law of every country requires them to submit their difference to the arbitrament of a court. What is demanded is that nations should be held to do the same. In other words, what is law for an individual should be law for a nation. In the human family the nation is the unit; in the single nation the individual is the unit, and the same ethics of law should be applicable to both. The failure to lay down the same rule of conduct and enforce the same law in international relations which govern individuals in separate states breeds the spirit of anarchy, and the barbarous idea that human beings should be permitted to kill each other when they are parts of a nation will prompt them to kill when they are facing each other as individuals.

Moreover, to those of you who have given any thought to the subject, it must have often occurred that war is never a guaranty for a just settlement of an honest difference, the same as a fight or a duel between men is never a guaranty that the injured party may obtain satisfaction. On the contrary, he has suffered the injury, and as the result of a fight he may be made to suffer the humiliation of defeat besides. The maxim of war is that might is right, and it is the same with a fight — it is merely a question of the survival of the most skillful or the strongest. The cause of justice is in either case absolutely ignored. We have in this country at least sufficiently progressed in culture and refined thought to ridicule duels between individuals. But is there any reason why duels between nations should be measured with a different rule of ethics — why they should not be ridiculed, if not scorned and abhorred? The members of the Interparliamentary Union contend that all the nations should settle their differences by arbitration, because moral as well as material rights will much more surely be vindicated by the impartial verdict of applied justice than by appeals to human passions and physical force. It was this principle which guided President Roosevelt when he called a second conference at The Hague and when he sent the arbitration treaties to the Senate. [Applause.]

And right here let me suggest to my friends on the other side of the Chamber that he did not do it as a Republican, but as an American President, and as American citizens, irrespective of faith and party affiliation, we should be proud of his act, an act which will weigh more in the scales of history than all the laurels earned by the heroism of the battlefield. The first Conference at The Hague was called by a representative of European autocracy, the second by a representative of American democracy. It is fair to assume that all shades of political opinion which lie between those two extremes approve the substitution of right for might, of justice for brute force, of arbitration for war, and it is also recognized as being in accord with the fitness of things that an American President should have wrested from the tottering hands of a czar the lead in this great movement for international justice and humanity. It is a rôle in which I want to see my country appear before the world, not threatening the world with its great power, but offering the olive branch to all the nations and endeavoring to elevate them to the intellectual height of the twentieth century, where the imperative demand is justice and goodwill among men. [Applause.]

In this connection it may be proper to refer to the arbitration treaties now pending in the Senate of the United States. They are part and parcel of the twentieth-century policy of our country and represent a concession wrung from Europe by the American spirit of liberty and peace. While these treaties are, as I said, pending in another House, yet I hold that, in view of the many popular demonstrations in their favor, the members of this House, as the direct representatives of the people, have an unquestioned right to express their opinion regarding them. I say they should be ratified without delay and without change. Mass meetings of citizens have recently been held in nearly all large cities calling upon Senators to take that course. I realize, Mr. Chairman, that these treaties do not go as far as they might, or as the true friends of arbitration may wish, but they are an entering wedge, and at least point the way in which all controversies of nations can and should be settled. The gist of the agreement in each case is contained in Article I, which is as follows:

"Differences which may arise of a legal nature, or relating to the interpretation of treaties existing between the two contracting parties and which it may not have been possible to settle by diplomacy, shall be referred to the permanent court of arbitration established at The Hague by the convention of the 29th July, 1899, provided, nevertheless, that they do not affect the vital interests, the independence, or the honor of the two contracting states, and do not concern the interests of third parties."

What does it mean? It means simply to apply the rules of conduct which control civilized society in each individual country to the larger field of international relations. Is not the United States furnishing the world a splendid example of the application of this principle by the agreement of its forty-five different states to submit all their differences to a supreme court as a high arbiter between them? What is there to hinder the nations of the earth emulating, by the creation and maintenance of an international supreme court, this glorious example, except it be human folly, combativeness, or narrow chauvinism? Let us at least hope that opposition to the first discreet steps in that direction, as represented by the language just quoted and its limited scope, may not emanate from this side of the Atlantic. Let us hope that no American Senator will stoop to stay the hand of our President when he proceeds to sign that magna charta of international justice and peace to which the spirit of the time prompted even European monarchs to subscribe. Yet, to tell the truth, I must confess that opposition has arisen in the Senate. It is caused by the fear that under such an agreement Uncle Sam might possibly be adjudged guilty of repudiation and held to pay the outlawed debts of several of our States. In other words, the opponents are mortally afraid that the United States might be "Venezuelaized." But it has evidently never occurred to them that under the "vital interest" clause of the agreement referred to Uncle Sam can wave such a question off by a simple shake of his head.

We are told by the same gentlemen that "these treaties will affect the people for ages to come," while in truth their life is limited to five years, when, of course, we hope to have them extended and their scope enlarged. It sounds like a voice from the grave when we hear such a treaty characterized as "a compact with imperialism" and the Hague Tribunal as an "imperial court." The fact is that the pages of our international history fairly bristle with such compacts and contracts, one of the first and most important being the purchase of the Louisiana territory from Napoleon. Every treaty of commerce is such a compact, and if we once proceeded to carry our aversion to the form of government of the majority of European countries into our international relations no treaty of any kind could ever again be concluded, because we surely could not deny to other governments the right to do exactly the same. And it may be possible that monarchies may have the same aversion to a republican form of government as we have to theirs, especially if the same caliber of critics should have their way in both. [Applause.]

No, Mr. Chairman, these objections will not hold good

before the forum of reason, and the civilized world will proceed to business in spite of them. To-day it is not so much the form of government that people care for as it is the kind of government which is meted out to them. Economical questions have taken the place of mere political problems, the discussion of which, in these latter days, has assumed a mere academical character. The true friends of arbitration in this country — and who to-day is not included in this collective term? — are for a closer acquaintance with the nations of the world, on the theory that to know each other better is to better understand each other, and on the basis of a mutual respectful understanding the peace of the world will be best secured. To-day nothing contributes more to this desirable end than the annual meetings of the Interparliamentary Union, to which I desired, in these few remarks, to direct the attention of the House. [Prolonged applause on both sides of the Chamber.]

Why the Decisions of the Hague Tribunal are and will be Obeyed.

BY SIMEON E. BALDWIN, LL.D.,

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If fifty years ago it had been predicted that, at the beginning of this century, an American would give the Queen of Holland a million and a half to build and furnish a courthouse at her capital, it would have been thought a wild prophecy of a foolish act. By such a gift, however, a stately building is soon to be constructed at The Hague, and Andrew Carnegie never put money to a better use. By this act he has strengthened the foundations on which international justice is now being built up. They are intangible and ideal foundations. But the ideal is not the unreal. The causes of human action in large affairs lie deep. We do best, in studying them, to follow the lead of Plato and St. Paul and "look not at the things which are seen, but at the things which are not seen; for the things which are seen are temporal, but the things which are not seen are eternal."

Human nature is so constituted that grand edifices make a deep impression on the mind. They give dignity to the use for which they are erected. They awake attention to what those uses are and mean. They give permanence to the feeling of which they are the expression. A splendid palace feeds the sentiment of loyalty; a great cathedral that of devotion; a stately courthouse that of reverence for justice administered by human tribunals.

Feeling takes a deeper hold of men than reason. Doubly is this true when the feeling is a reasonable one. Laws and institutions all rest ultimately on public sentiment for their support. If in any progressive nation it be a blind sentiment of imperfect civilization, it will change, and they will change; if it be an enlightened sentiment, in harmony with right reason, it will not change, and in essentials they will not change.

The character of the international proceedings that centre at The Hague is often misunderstood. It is a court that is to sit in this new palace of justice; a body composed not of arbitrators, but of judges.

Arbitration is the decision of a controversy, not by judicial methods, but according to the notions which those who make it entertain as to what, on the whole, is a reasonable mode of settlement, under the circumstances of the particular case. The personality of the arbitrators counts for much. Their relations to the parties are apt to have some influence upon their action. They are generally selected after the controversy has arisen; each side choosing one whom it thinks likely to lean its way, and these two a third as umpire.

On the other hand, a judicial tribunal before which a cause is brought is commonly made up of men appointed before the dispute commenced; and its judgment, if fairly rendered by competent men, after ascertaining the facts, applies to them fixed, certain, and inexorable rules of law. It is of no consequence whether these bear harshly on one of the contending parties. Whatever under these rules is the logical result follows with the certainty of syllogistic reasoning.

The Hague tribunal created by the Convention of 1899 is a court of justice. Its judges are appointed in advance of any controversy that is to come before it. In their selection the whole civilized world has a share. It differs from other high courts mainly in that it is higher; so high that it has no means of compelling the execution of its judgments, and that it needs none.

It is seldom that the judgments of any civil court require to be enforced by the power of the government. It is enough that the losing party knows that there is such a power behind it. There is also a certain reverence for law, which comes less from a feeling of its latent force than from the innermost conviction of every man that it is the best human expression of what is right between one man and another.

The judgments of the Hague tribunal cannot fail to appeal to this spirit of reverence in man, and the appeal will be stronger still when they are pronounced from a seat of justice between nations, housed in a splendid palace, built by a private citizen as a gift to the world.

But they have another and deeper hold upon the parties to them. These have both voluntarily agreed to submit their controversy to a decision of this kind. In ordinary lawsuits one party is summoned before the court without his consent and probably against his will. Before an international tribunal nations appear only by mutual agreement. Hence they come under a double obligation. They break faith if they refuse to abide by the decision which they have invoked.

The Hague tribunal became possible only when international law had obtained a position of assured authority and had been so far developed and extended as to cover, directly or by the help of analogy, most cases of dispute likely to arise between independent powers. Laws precede courts.

It became possible only, also, when general respect for the principles of justice in dealings between nations had become a rule of national and international action, supported and demanded by public opinion throughout the civilized world. The nineteenth century did not close before this became an accomplished fact. A means was thus secured for the execution of any decree which the Hague tribunal might pass, or of the awards rendered in any proceeding of international arbitration.

For a nation to make itself a party to such a contro-